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R E L E AS E
0 N
REMARKS OF SENATOR MIKE MANSFIELD (D., MONTANA)
at the
CONVOCATION
MEMORIAL GYMNASIUM
Sunday, February 11,

1968

8:00p.m., e.s.t.

VIET NAM

My remarks, today, deal with Viet Nam.

Before

proceeding to them, however, I wish to refer to the USS Pueblo
incident.

When added to the Vietnamese conflict, it is illustra-

tive of the hydra-headed character of military involvement on
the mainland of Asia.

War spreads readily on that continent;

the difficulty lies in curbing it.

I would emphaEize, therefore,

that while the urgency in Viet Nam is to bring one bloody conflict
to a close, the imperative in Korea is to prevent the opening
of another.
In the latter connection, it will help to bear in
mind the essentials of the Pueblo affair.

A U.

s.

vessel--that

it was an electronic listener of some sort is not disputed--was
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in a position off the North Korean coast.

What vital national

need prompted the dispatch of this particular mission or why the
vessel went undefended are

nt,:!n.

All reports available to me indicate that the
Pueblo was in international waters at the time it was taken.
As of the moment, the Pueblo is now at anchor in Wonsan harbor
and the 82 surviving crewmen who were aboard--one other has
died--are interned in North Korea.

That ineluctable fact is

in no way altered by a sense of outrage or indignation.
The crew aboard the Pueblo was carrying out a
dangerous assignment.

The "why" and the "how" of the mission

are moot at this point.
those men.

What matters now is the obligation to

In our reactions to the Pueblo affair, lives must

not become the pawns of either pride or petulance.

Every effort

to bring about their release must be made.
We will also do well to bear in mind that the one
war in which we are engaged on the Asian mainland has become a
source of immense grief.

Any move which leads into a second

- 3 Vietnamese-type conflict in Korea will compound the grief but
hardly serve the interests of this nation.
In sum, what most matters at this point, it seems
to me, is:

(1)

return of the 80-odd American crewmen· alive--

I repeat, alive--and; (2) prevention of a second war in Korea
on the pattern of Viet Nam which could the more readily become
World War III.
The firm restraint which President Johnson has
exercised from the outset of the Pueblo affair has set a wise
course for this nation.

The question has been raised at the

United Nations Security Council by Ambassador Arthur Goldberg.
It has been pursued at the Panmunjom truce site in discussions
between our representatives and those of North Korea. ·· Other
channels are also being tapped which might lead to the release
of the crewmen.

In short, the President's policy at this time

is to seek a solution by diplomacy.

It is the course of prudence

and reason in what is, at best, a delicate and dangerous situation .

It deserves every support of the nation.
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will bear fruit.
available.

is no certainty that the present efforts

Other possibilities, however, may also be

I would point out, for example, that, if necessary,

the matter should be pressed further at the United Nations which
has had a definite responsibility in Korea for almost two decades
If it comes to that, it may be feasible to seek impartial arbitration or mediation or a presentation of the entire matter t o
the World Court.

May I say that precedent for the latter proce-

dure is to be found in a similar dispute two decades ago over
the loss of two British destroyers off the Albanian Coast.
vfuatever the specific recourse, in my judgment,
the efforts to find a peaceful solution in the Pueb lo affair
are attuned to this nation's interest.

vfuat matters in my

judgment is saving lives, not saving face.

~~at

matters is

the substance not the shadow of this nation's interests.
That is true in Korea; and it is no less true in
VietNam.

The nation's interests in VietNam, in my judgment,

lie in bringing the war to an honorable conclusion at the
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earliest possible moment.

The pursuit of a negotiated solution

was right for this nation before the recent coordinated offensives in the South Vietnamese cities.

It is right today, while

that offensive continues in certain areas and when a second
offensive may be on the verge of opening, if not in Khe Sanh,
somewhere else in the remote highlands of central Viet Nam.
Insofar as I can see, negotiations a re and have
always been the only rational alternative in this situation to
an indefinite U. S. involvement on the Southeast Asian mai nland.
Two years ago I joined four Senate colleagues, including Senator
Muskie, in a report at the CJnclusion of a visit to Southeast
Asia .

Our principal obse rvat ion, then, was that the Amer i can

position i n Viet Nam had the character of "pressing against a
military s ituation whi ch is, in effect, open-ended."

We added

this c omment:"How open is dependent on the extent to which North
Viet Nam and its supporters are willing and able to meet
i ncreased f o rce by increased force ."

~r.cr e~~~

It i s more apparent now

than it was at the t ime that the war is open-ended .

How open
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may be uncertain--in my judgment it is still wide open--but in
any event, to date, the NLF and the North Vietnamese have been
both able and willing to meet increased force with increased
force.
At the beginning of 1966, the United States already
had 180,000 men in Viet Nam.

American forces directly involved

in the war have since tripled to something approaching 600,000-with over 500,000 on the ground in Viet Nam and the others serving the war from elsewhere in the region.
ties have gone well past 100,000.
<

Total American casual-

Last year's toll of those

/'U a. t;_

killed i n action showed a ...B~ fold- i ncrease in two years, from
1,964 in 1965 to 9,353 in 1967.
This increase i n the American military effort has
been met by increases i n the North Vietnamese-NLF effort; their
casualties, too, have increased greatly.

The war, in short,

has risen over the past three years to ever higher intensities
of destructiveness.

The bas ic juxtaposition in Viet Nam, however

- 7 has not been altered as anticipated.

In the spring of 1965, the

all-consuming objective of the American effort was to prevent
the collapse of a government with which we had allied ourselves .
Almost three years later, countless thousands of lives later,
and tens of billions of dollars later, that is still the
objective.
One can put whatever interpretation one chooses
on the recent events in Viet Nam.

To me, however, they suggest

that the survival of the Saigon political structure, in its
present form, may now be more uncertain.

The pacification

program appears to have gone the route of at least a dozen prior
schemes for "winning the people'' by providing them with security
and a stake i n the structure.

The cities of South Viet Nam

which have heretofore been spared most of the ravage s of the war,
almost by tacit understanding, have now been drawn into the
vortex of its terrible devastation.

If there is an alternative

to chaos in what has heretofore been the core of the government's
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strength, it will lie in yet another costly task of reconstruction and rehabilitation whjch can hardly be borne by the South
Vietnamese government.
What is now clear is that no part of South Viet
Nam is secure for anyone.

The hamlets, villages, and the cities

of Viet Nam are seen to be honeycombed with a NLF infrastructure
which has undoubtedly existed for many years, which is still
intact and which may well be stronger than ever.
It is possible to point to one-sided casualty
figures and to echo one-sided words of reassurance.

If we are

interested in saving lives rather than saving face, however, I
think we will find the realism to confront the implications of
the present situation.

The Saigon political structure is no

stronger today than it was three years ago in the sense of being
able on its own to govern, to defend or to rally the people of
South Viet Nam.

Indeed, its very survival now appears more

dependent upon American military power than at any time in the
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In short, once again there is not the beginnings of a

beginning of a stable political situation in South Viet Nam.
That such is the case, in no way reflects on the
courage or the competence of the military forces which have
carried the burden of combat in Viet Nam for many months.

In

statistical terms, these forces have been immensely effective.
They have won major engagement after engagement.

The figures

say that over 87,000 enemy troops were killed last year, that
another 27,000 have crossed over to the government side and that
countless thousands were captured or were otherwise put out of
action.

Naval and air power have pounded so much of North Viet

Nam into rubble that there are left unscathed scarcely any
military or industr ial targets.
Nevertheless, for the kind of war which is being
fought in South Viet Nam, the forces in opposition continue to
obtain adequate and, apparently, ever more sophisticated military supplies over the infiltration routes from the North.

The
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NLF remains omnipresent, from the demilitariz ed zone at the
17th parallel to the Mekong Delta and i ts regular forces and
guerillas are steeled to accept great privation and to make
enormous sacrifices.

The Viet Cong remain entrenched and vir-

tually untouched in their traditional strongholds--the swamps,
paddy-fields and hamlets of the Mekong Delta--from whence they
are now seen to be able to dispatch forces to Saigon and other
cities.

North Viet Nam has committed to the war in the South

considerably less than a quarter of the well-trained forces of
General Giap.

And beyond North Viet Nam lies the untapped

manpower of China and the supply sources of both China and the
Soviet Union.
These are some of the reali ties whj_ch the computers of

11

progress" in this war do not measure.

These are

some of the realities which urge us to recall the original
purposes for wh i ch the nation was committed to South Viet Nam.
They were, above all, limited purposes.

We went into Viet Nam

not to take over a war but on the assumption that we were
summoned to aid the people of South Viet Nam.
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From the outset, it was not an American responsibility and it is not now an American responsibility to win a
victory for any particular Vietnamese group, or to defeat any
particular Vietnamese group.

It was not then and it is not now

an American function to insure that any political structure
shall be enshrined over the smoldering ruins of a devastated
Viet Nam.

Even if we could, we should not seek to synthesize

a government or system for South Viet Nam.

That is not the

responsibility of the American military command, the American
economists and the American political scientists who are
gathered in Saigon.

That is a responsibility which can only

be exercised by the Vietnamese people themselves.

The sooner

that the limits of our commitment are recognized by all
directly concerned, therefore, the better for all concerned.
We need to face the probability, bluntly, that
the build-up of the American involvement, in its very
immensity, may well have already extended the role of this
nation beyond those limits.

In so doing, it may not be aiding--
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as it was i ntended--to resolve the s ituation in accord with the
wishes of the people of South Viet Nam.

It is apparent, for

example, that the more that U. S. forces have taken the major
combat role, the slacker have been the efforts of the allied
indigenous forces.

It is apparent, too, that a massive U. S.

technological presence in South Viet Nam has exerted a revolutionary impact on the whole of the fabric of traditional
Vietnamese society.
In a physical sense, the crushing weight of
modern warfare has fallen not only on the Viet Cong--the NLF-and the North Vietnamese but on all Vietnamese.

The terrible

cost in lives and property throughout Viet Nam is borne by
Vietnamese of all political colors.
Our immense effort, in short, has gone a long way
in altering the character of what was once an inner struggle
among Vietnamese.

In the end, however, the future of Viet Nam

must depend on the Vietnamese themselves.

It is their country;

- 13 they live i n it.

They will be living in it long after we are

gone from it.
Our commitment is to support, not to submerge.
To strip the Vietnamese struggle of its Vietnamese character,
to convert it into a war to be won or lost by this nation,
detracts from its relevance both to the people of Viet Nam and
to the people of the United States.

To do so is to consolidate

an American involvement on the Southeast Asian mainland of j_ndef i nite duration and obscure purpose whose terminus is not
visible--not in Viet Nam, not in Laos, or in Cambodia.

Indeed,

i t may well be an involvement which is without exit except in
World War III.
This nation is deeply committed in South Viet Nam
but let us not make the mistake of interpreting that commitment
as compelling us-- i n the name of victory or whatever--to see to
it that every last member of the NLF is either dulled, dead, or
fleeing to the North, and that North Viet Nam has been bombed
back into the Stone Age.

That course leads not to an ending but

- 14 to an endless succession of vjolent beginnings.

An interminable

involvement of American forces may meet the desires of some in
Viet Nam or of some other nation, but that course does not
accord with the substance of the interests of the United States.
President Johnson has repeatedly stated that this
nation's objective is " ... only that the people of South VietNam
be allowed to guide their own country in their own way."

He

has stated that he is w5.lling to move at any time in negotiation r
which might bring about that result.
It should be made clear to all concerned--Americans and Vietnamese--that that is the extent of this nation's
commitment.
Viet Nam.

The commitment is to all of the people of South
We have no obligation to continue to pour out the

blood and resources of this nation until South Viet Nam is
made safe for one faction or another.
Indeed, in my judgment, there is little prospect
of meeting our actual commitment to the people o f Viet Nam in
the visible future unless there is a prompt restoration of
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On that basis, every avenue--in the United Nations or

elsewhere--should continue to be explored in an effort to reach
an honorable conclusion.

In so doing, this nation needs no

sanction or approval from any group, leader, or whomever in
Viet Nam or anywhere else.
In the hope of bringing about a peaceful settlement without adding to the burdens of the American forces in
the south, I have joined Senator Cooper and others in urging
that the bombing of North Viet Nam be restricted to the infiltration routes at the 17th parallel.

I am frank to say, however

that while it may well result in negotiations, I am not at all
sure that a cessation of the bombing is the critical factor in
bringing this war to an honorable conclusion.

More important,

in my judgment, is the framework in which the war in Viet Nam
is seen and within which its conclusion is negotiated.

It is

doubtful that there is a basis for fruitful negotiations if
the conflict is defined as a simple case of aggression on the
part of the North against the South.

The reality is far more
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That is true insofar as the relation-

ship between North and South Viet Nam is concerned.

It is true

insofar as the relationship of the various groups and elements
within SouthViet Nam is concerned.

The government in Saigon,

as it is presently constituted continues to be run by a faction
of military officers--indeed, most of whom are northerners-and they are by no means the whole political coin.

There are

other grJups of southern Vietnamese who must be taken more into
consideration if there is to be an end to the bloodshed in the
foreseeable future.

These groups include not only those within

the Nat;onal Liberation Front but elements wh · ch are now without
significant voice in either camp.
A negotiated solution, if there is to be one, may
well involve preliminary discussions among the political, religous, and sectarian groups, as well as the ruling military group,
which are to be found under the Saigon structure.

If there can

be some common agreement among them to seek a settlement of the
war, it is at least conceivable that there could then be

..
- 17 discussions with the National Liberation Front.

Needless to

say, such discussions can hardly take place if the Saigon govern·
ment regards even words of compromise as treasonable.
If the door could be opened to peace-talks among
the South Vietnamese themselves, one would hope that it would
make easier the opening of doors to negotiat i ons between this
nation and North Viet Nam and among all the nations directly or
indirectly concerned in the conflict.

A basis might then be

laid for applying the Geneva accords of 1954 and 1962 in determining the future relationship of the two parts of Viet Nam and
for guaranteeing the neutralization of Viet Nam and all of IndoChina.

May I add it does not much matter whether such discus-

sions are held under United Nations auspices or in Geneva, or
in some other appropriate forum.

What is necessary is that

they encompass all who are closely involved, including China,
if there is to be a durable peace in

V~

Nam and Indo-China.
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prospects for progress towards peace i n this approach than
in the countless others wh i ch have been suggested.

I believe ,

however, that unless there is the beginni ng of a negotiated
peace, the f i res of war in Viet Nam will blaze ever more
fiercely.

They will spread further and further, leaving

ever wider arcs of a piteous wreckage.

And if the fires

burn out of control to World War III, what nation will
claim the victory?
claim it?

Indeed, what nation will be left to

